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Some two million Americans are currently incarcerated, with roughly six
hundred thousand to be released this year. Despite this, little is known about
the effects of confinement conditions on the post-release lives of inmates. Fo-
cusing on post-release criminal activity, we identify the causal effect of prison
conditions on recidivism rates by exploiting a discontinuity in the assignment
of federal prisoners to security levels. We find that harsher prison conditions
are associated with significantly more post-release crime.
There are similar punishments and crimes called by the same name,
but there are no two beings equal in regard to their morals; and every time
that convicts are put together, there exists necessarily a fatal influence of
some upon others, because, in the association of the wicked, it is not the
less guilty who act upon the more criminal, but the more depraved who
influence those who are less so.
Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville, 1833
∗We are extremely grateful for data and helpful conversations to Scott Camp, Gerry Gaes, Miles
Harer, Neal Langan, Bo Saylor, and their colleagues at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of
Research and Evaluation. We thank Dan Benjamin, Jason Burnett, Judy Chevalier, Ray Fair,
Matthew Gentzkow, Edward Glaeser, Claudia Goldin, Larry Katz, David Laibson, Ilyana Kuziemko,
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America’s jails and prisons house roughly two million inmates (Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, 2002), nearly twice as many as in 1990 and more in per capita terms
than any other OECD country (OECD, 2001). Current and former prisoners con-
stitute an increasingly large share of the U.S. population, yet little is known about
the effects that imprisonment and prison conditions have on the subsequent lives of
inmates.1 This omission is unfortunate: each year roughly six-hundred thousand peo-
ple are released from incarceration (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002), and roughly
two-thirds of those released will be rearrested within three years (Langan and Levin,
2002). Crimes by former inmates alone thus account for a substantial share of current
and future crime. Moreover, unlike many determinants of crime, prison conditions
are directly under the control of policymakers and the criminal justice system. Un-
derstanding the effect of confinement on post-release criminal activity is therefore
essential to good crime-control policy.2
Theory alone cannot tell us whether an increase in the severity of prison conditions
will increase or decrease the propensity of inmates to commit crimes after release.
Models of “specific deterrence” (Smith and Gartin, 1989), which posit that criminals
learn from their own experiences about the severity of penalties, predict that harsher
conditions will decrease the propensity to recidivate. Alternatively, if harsher prison
conditions correspond to inferior labor market outcomes (as suggested by Western,
Kling, and Weiman, 2001), or if prison life induces a taste for violence (Banister,
Smith, Heskin and Bolston, 1973 ), then harsher conditions may lead to more crime
following release. More generally, a growing literature on social interactions highlights
1A notable exception is Bayer, Pintoff, and Pozen (2003), which focuses on the effects of social
interactions among juvenile on subsequent criminal behavior. Camp and Gaes (2003) study the
effects of prison conditions on in-prison misconduct.
2For example, the literature on prison privatization has recently focused much of its attention
on whether private prisons are likely to provide lower quality services than publicly managed pris-
ons (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; Camp and Gaes, 2001). If prison conditions affect rates of
post-release crime commission, then providing quality-based incentives to private prison managers
becomes an even higher priority.
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the influence of peer effects on criminal behavior (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman,
1996; Bayer, Pintoff, and Pozen, 2003). During incarceration, inmates may acquire
skills, learn of new prospects, or develop criminal contacts.
In this paper we exploit a feature of the federal inmate classification system to
estimate the effect of moving a prisoner to a higher security level. Prior to incar-
ceration, every federal inmate is assigned a score intended to reflect his need for
supervision. Inmates are then assigned to a prison security level depending on where
his score falls relative to certain predetermined cutoff values. By comparing inmates
on either side of the boundaries between different security levels, we estimate the
effect on recidivism of being assigned to a higher security level. Since both the phys-
ical and social conditions of confinement vary dramatically with security level, this
setting provides a quasi-experiment for identifying the effect of prison conditions on
post-release outcomes.
Our approach avoids the obvious confounds inherent in simply comparing rearrest
rates of prisoners in different security levels. Even with controls for demographics,
such an estimation strategy would ignore the fact that prisoners are assigned to
security levels based on characteristics such as crime severity that are themselves
likely to predict recidivism. By taking careful account of the assignment mechanism,
we can avoid bias introduced by the endogeneity of security level.
We find that moving a prisoner from minimum to low security roughly doubles
his probability of rearrest within three years following release. This effect is not
present in a control population of prisoners who are assigned scores but are not housed
with the general prison population, suggesting that our findings are indeed driven by
the effect of prison conditions on inmates. Moreover, predetermined demographic
characteristics display no discontinuities at the cutoffs, providing further support for
the existence of a treatment effect of security level on recidivism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the relationship between
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security level and conditions of confinement and describes the dataset. Section 2
presents our findings as well as some checks on the plausbility of our identifying
assumptions. Section 3 concludes.
1 Background and Data Description
1.1 Inmate Classification and Security Level
Upon entry to the federal prison system, an inmate is processed using an Inmate
Load and Security Designation Form (see Figure 1). The Security Designation Data
recorded on this form are used to produce the individual’s security custody score.3
In the construction of this score, each of seven items contributes points to an overall
sum. For example, offenses are grouped into five categories, from lowest severity (such
as “counterfeiting, under $2000”) to greatest severity (such as homicide), and each
inmate receives an associated offense severity score ranging from 0 (least severe) to
7 (most severe). The scoring is done by an Regional Designator at the Bureau of
Prisons, and follows a procedure laid out in detail in the Bureau of Prisons Security
Designation and Custody Classification Manual (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1982).
Important for our identifying assumption is that no aspect of the score requires the
Designator to exercise any personal judgment; all crimes, sentences, and judicial
recommendations translate directly into a unique scoring. In the Appendix we discuss
in detail how the components of the score are determined, and Appendix Table 2a
summarizes how those components sum to the overall score.
Once the score has been computed, it is compared to a set of cutoff values (see Ap-
pendix Table 2b) to determine an inmate’s security level. This is done mechanically,
3The score is intended to predict prisoner misconduct and therefore to measure the supervision
needs of individuals. Over time, the score has been refined through continuing research into the
predictors of prisoner misconduct (Harer and Langan, 2001).
4
however certain additional (observable) considerations may intervene to prevent the
inmate from being housed in what would otherwise be his security level. For example,
deportable aliens may not be housed in minimum security, nor can those who have
been convicted of threats to government officials.4 Such considerations are recorded
on the security designation form as public safety factors, and most have the effect of
excluding an inmate from minimum security. Finally, inmates who suffer from chronic
medical conditions are also scored, but are housed separately in a prison medical facil-
ity (latter we will use this subsample as a control group to test the robustness of our
primary specification). In some cases security level can be changed at the discretion
of a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) official, although such instances appear rare. Once a
security level has been assigned to an inmate a BOP employee assigns the inmate to
a prison based primarily on location and on the availability of space.5
An inmate’s assigned security level has an enormous impact on his experiences in
prison. As Appendix Table 2a details, prisoners convicted of more severe offenses,
prisoners with more serious prior records, and prisoners with histories of violence are
all, by design, more likely to be placed in more secure facilities. Thus comparing
prisoners in different security levels one would find that those housed in more secure
facilities are exposed to more violent individuals with more serious criminal histories.
Given the growing literature on peer effects and the intensity of contact co-housed
prisoners experience, this alone would suggest large security-level effects on post-
prison characteristics.
Unfortunately, very few anthropological or ethnographic studies compare facili-
ties with different security levels.6 Fortunately, ample inmate survey data provides
4Other such considerations include medical and mental health, aggressive sexual behavior, offense
severity, organized crime, and gang membership.
5An inmate can change facilities or security levels during the course of his incarceration, due, for
example, to changes in health or to in-prison misconduct. As changes are endogenous, we will focus
on security level upon entry to the federal prison system.
6Accounts of life in prison typically focus on one institution, usually maximum security (Sykes,
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a reasonable account of how life differs across security levels. Sufficient for our pur-
poses, the Survey of Inmates of Federal Correctional Facilities (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1991), contains data on inmate demographics, criminal histories, experiences
in prison, and self-reported conditions of confinement for a nationally representative
sample of federal inmates.7
Table 1 presents some simple comparisons across security levels, both in self-
reported conditions of confinement and in-prison misconduct. The data strongly
confirm the intuition that more secure facilities allow less contact with the community
and less freedom of movement. While 14% of minimum security inmates report having
been allowed furloughs during their current period of confinement, only 2.5% of low
security inmates have had furloughs; for maximum security inmates the figure is
below 1%. Similar trends show up in the percent of respondents who have been
seriously injured during confinement. Moving from minimum to low security exposes
an additional 2.7% to serious injury; moving from low to medium or medium to
maximum increases the rate of injury by 1.2% and 1.8%, respectively.
On the whole then, the available evidence strongly suggests that conditions of
imprisonment differ dramatically by security level. Higher security prisons involve
less contact with the outside world, allow less freedom, and subject inmates to far
more violence.
1.2 Data
Our data are a representative sample of 1,205 inmates released from federal prisons in
the first six months of 1987 (Harer, 1994). Data on demographic characteristics and
criminal histories were recorded for all inmates in the sample, as were the inmates’
1958; Conover, 2001).
7While using self-reported data to compare conditions across security levels does raise some
methodological issues, Camp (1999) has found that such surveys do contain information helpful in
making comparisons between facilities.
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security custody scores and security levels on entry to the system, when available.8
Following release, the FBI provided records of all re-arrests on either state for federal
charges within a three year window of release. Hence even though all inmates in our
sample were initially incarcerated for federal crimes, we have records of all subsequent
re-arrests within 3 years, even if they took place under state jurisdiction.
Of the original sample of 1,205 inmates, security level data are missing for 16, and
11 served short sentences in halfway houses that do not have a security designation.
Another 216 were placed in administrative facilities for special medical needs; we will
later use this sub-sample as a control group in our analysis. Finally, 12 inmates have
missing data on score, leaving a total sample of 950 with usable data.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for this group. Over half of all of inmates
were rearrested within three years of release, a level comparable to most state-level
studies of recidivism (Camp and Camp, 1997). Other sample characteristics are
less surprising: relative to the U.S. population, the sample contains more males,
fewer whites, fewer high school graduates, and more previously convicted offenders.
Grouping by security level, Table 2 also demonstrates the large changes in these
characteristics across levels. For example, the percent of convicts rearrested within 3
years is 38% in minimum security, but jumps to 55% for low security, and is 60% for
all levels higher then low. In these level statistics the most dramatic changes occur
when leaving minimum security, leading us to suspect that our strongest results will
come from this break.
A crucial requirement for our analysis is that security level vary discontinuously
with score. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the data confirm what policy implies: the
probability of being placed in low rather than minimum security jumps discretely
8In many cases—usually inmates who entered the system prior to the introduction of modern
computer records—data from the initial classification form was not available. In these cases score and
security level were recorded from the earliest available reclassification form. The components of the
score are unlikely to change during confinement, and conditional on time of entry, we find that our
conclusions are quite similar (and statistically indistinguishable) across the two groups.
7
when the score passes the official cutoff of 6. Similar jumps are visible at each cutoff
(see Appendix Table 1).
2 Results
Given how drastically prison conditions vary across security levels, it is plausible that
the type of an inmate’s prison greatly affects his post-prison outcomes. To test this
we exploit the fact that the assignment process outlined in Section 1 exhibits dis-
continuities at several pre-determined cut-off points. Inmates who find themselves at
opposite ends of any of these cutoffs are likely to be ex-ante comparable in all under-
lying attributes, providing us with a quasi-experimental way of testing the effects of
security level.
2.1 Regression Discontinuity
In a regression-discontinuity design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Rubin, 1977; Berk
and De Leeuw, 1999), subjects are assigned a treatment condition based on cutoff
values of a known and measured assignment score. For federal inmates the security
designation score discussed in Section 1.1 serves this purpose.9 By conditioning our
analysis of recidivism on both an inmate’s score (constrained to enter smoothly) and
their resulting security level, we obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effect.
This design assumes that all variables (over which ex-post recidivism differs) vary
continuously with the assignment score, while the treatment jumps discontinuously
9Regression discontinuity is not new to the study of crime. Berk and Rauma (1983) investigate
the effects of transitional aid to prisoners on recidivism, exploiting a California policy which extends
unemployment insurance to prisoners who work a certain number of hours prior to release. Berk
and de Leeuw (1999) also study the California prison system, using a regression discontinuity design
to predict the effects of various assignment procedures on in-prison misconduct. Economists have
use regression discontinuity to estimate the effects of financial aid on college enrollment (van der
Klaauw 2001), the effect of incumbency on election results (Lee, 2001), and the effects of class size
on school performance (Hoxby, 2000).
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at the pre-determined cutoff. In essence then, within a small interval around a cutoff
the allocation of prisoners to different security levels amounts to a random assignment
procedure.
As a first pass at the data, Table 3 compares rearrest percentages between small
groups just above and below the minimum security / low security cutoff. Inmates
with scores of 7 or 8 are significantly more likely to be rearrested within one, two,
or three years following release than those with scores of 5 or 6. These differences
persist (but lose statistical precision) when we restrict the sample by “squeezing in”
to inmates with scores of 6 and 7 only.
2.2 Reduced-form Estimates
To analyze the data more formally, we run a probit analysis using as a dependent
variable the probability of being rearrested after 1, 2, or 3 years following release.
Our independent variables will be polynomial terms in score, demographic controls,
and dummies for the three score cutoffs relevant to our data. Since having a score
above a certain cutoff does not guarantee placement in a higher security level (see
Figure 2 and Appendix Table 1), the results in this section will be reduced-form
estimates of the effect of score cutoffs on recidivism. In the next subsection we will
present estimates that can be interpreted more directly as the effect of security level
on rearrest.
Applying our regression discontinuity design, we assume that recidivism varies
continuously with score and model that relationship with a high-order polynomial.
To estimate the treatment effect of score cutoffs, we allow dummies for cutoff levels
to induce a additive shifts in the latent probit variable. In other words, assuming
that the two within-group conditional expectation functions are parallel shifts of a
normal CDF gives us our first design:
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P (Rt) = Φ(βX + λg(score) + α1S6 + α2S9 + α3S13) (1)
Here Rt is 1 if an inmate has recidivated after t years and 0 if he has not, g is a fourth
order polynomial in the security custody score, and Sn are dummies for score > n.
X is a matrix of covariates that predict recidivism.10 Table 4 presents the results of
this analysis.
Columns (1) through (4) present the results with the dependant variable being
the probability of rearrest within a three-, two-, or one-year window following release.
Controlling for a polynomial in security custody score, there is a significant effect of
prison security level on the probability of post-release rearrest. Focusing on the cutoff
between minimum (score of 1-6) and low (7-9) security prisons (the only discontinuity
well represented in our sample), we see that assigning an inmate to low security
roughly doubles his chances of rearrest in three years when compared to minimum
security. This result is supported by positive coefficients on rearrest within a two and
one year window.
Because our data include precise information on the date of rearrest, by using
only dummies for rearrest within particular time frames we are ignoring some of the
variation in recidivism. To check whether our results are sensitive to this decision,
we have re-run the reduced-form analysis in Table 4 using a Cox proportional hazard
model of time-to-rearrest (not shown). The results are quite similar in direction,
magnitude, and statistical significance.11
10Covariates include age and dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions, married, white,
male, and employed prior to arrest.
11We have also examined the variation of our results across types of crimes and find that rearrest
rates for violent, nonpecuniary crimes seem to be most sensitive to security level (results not shown).
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2.3 Two-stage Least Squares Results
The results in the previous section show the effect of exceeding score cutoffs on the
probability of rearrest. Because the score cutoffs do not perfectly determine the
security level in which an inmate is housed, the coefficients in Table 4 cannot be
interpreted as estimates of the effect of security level on the probability of rearrest.
To get such an estimate, we need to adjust the coefficients to correct for the imperfect
link between security custody score and security level.
The standard tool for making such an adjustment is the two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimator. To estimate a 2SLS model, we restrict attention to inmates housed
in either minimum or low security facilities. This allows us to focus on the effects of
moving from minimum to low security, the cutoff at which our data are thickest. We
estimate a linear probability model12 using rearrest as a dependent variable:
P (Rt) = βX + λg(score) + α (low) + ε (2)
Here Rt is 1 if an inmate has recidivated after t years and 0 if he has not, g is a fourth
order polynomial in the security custody score, and low is a dummy equal to one
when the inmate is in a low security facility. X is a matrix of covariates that predict
recidivism.13 In estimating equation (2), we will instrument for low with a dummy
equal to one when the score is greater than or equal to six. Thus, our identification
will come only from the discontinuity in the recidivism rate around a score of six, and
our estimates will be interpretable as the causal effect of security level on rearrest.
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. Although these results are somewhat
less precise than the reduced-form estimates shown in Table 4, in general they show a
12Because of the well-known limitations of linear probability models, we have checked our findings
with an estimation procedure (Amemiya Generalized Least Squares) that incorporates a probit
specification for the probability of rearrest (Newey, 1987). The point estimates and statistical
significance are quite similar; we report results from 2SLS here because it is the more familiar tool.
13Covariates include age and dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions, married, white,
male, and employed prior to arrest.
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large, positive and statistically significant effect of low security (relative to minimum
security) on the probability of rearrest. For example, our estimates imply that moving
an inmate from minimum to low security would increase his probability of being
rearrested within three years by roughly 33 percentage points.
2.4 Robustness
The estimates we have presented are consistent under the maintained hypothesis that
all correlates of recidivism vary continuously with score. While it is not possible to
test all covariates, we can ask whether observed covariates meet this criterion. Table
7 tests for discontinuities in our control variables, regressing demographic character-
istics (high school degree status, prior convictions, race, and employment) as of entry
to prison on dummies for score cutoffs and a fourth-order polynomial in score. As
columns (1) through (4) report, none of these characteristics appears to have a dis-
continuity at the score cutoffs. Thus it seems unlikely that our results are driven by
a pre-existing discontinuity at the score cutoffs.
An alternative check on our assumptions is to examine a population with known
scores that is not housed in accordance with the security guidelines of those scores.
Inmates housed in “administrative” facilities, which are essentially prison hospitals,
constitute just such a population. They are housed apart from the general population
and are therefore not exposed to the variation in conditions of confinement that we
discussed in Section 1. Our dataset contains 211 inmates with known scores who
were housed in administrative facilities. Overall these inmates exhibit similar rates
of recidivism to the general inmate population, and we find that similar demographic
characteristics predict recidivism in both groups. As Table 8 reports, there is no evi-
dence of a discontinuous relationship between score and recidivism for these inmates.
Moving an inmate housed in an administrative facility from minimum to low security
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designation has an insignificant negative effect on the probability of rearrest. In some
specifications, there is a significant positive effect of being assigned to a medium se-
curity facility on rearrest, but the result is not consistent across specifications and
should be interpreted with caution given the limited data available to identify such
an effect.
A final concern is that our estimates measure the post-prison arrest rate, not
necessarily the crime-commission rate. The claim that harsher prison conditions
increase the commission of crimes rests on the assumption that the probability of
arresting an ex-convict conditional on his having committed a crime does not depend
on his former security level. For example, if upon release a low security inmate
is subject to more frequent drug tests than his minimum security counterpart, our
results may be picking up an increased probability of rearrest that has nothing to do
with increased criminal tendencies.
Although the parole system leaves room for individual discretion, most state parole
agencies use standardized risk assessment tools to map inmates into supervision levels
(Jones et al, 1999). None of the instruments we examined take account of an inmate’s
former security level, nor look as if their cutoffs coincide with those in the security
custody score. Furthermore, the variables these systems do take into account relate
primarily to providing the appropriate services (drug users receive drug counselling)
and limiting especially newsworthy crimes (convicted sex offenders are monitored
very closely). Finally, the effect of security level on recidivism is visible even if we
exclude parole violations from our sample. Thus, while we cannot completely rule
out a bias, it seems likely that the coefficients we obtain represent a true treatment
effect of security level on criminal activity and not just an increased probability of
arrest conditional on the amount of crime committed.
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3 Conclusion
With over two million inmates currently incarcerated and six hundred thousand in-
mates released per year, the demographic impact of American prisons can hardly be
overstated. In this paper we have attempted to understand the impact that incar-
ceration has on inmates’ subsequent lives, focusing on perhaps the most serious and
socially costly consequence of that incarceration, recidivism into crime. Our findings
suggest that inmates harsher prison conditions cause higher rates of post-release crim-
inal behavior. By exploiting discontinuities in the assignment of inmates to different
security levels, we isolate the component of this effect that results directly from prison
conditions.
To the degree that as an institution, prisons exist to reduce crime (both through
deterrence and incapacitation) our estimates serve as counterpoint. The deterrence
effect of harsher sentences has been widely studied, and the incapacitation of crimi-
nals clearly reduces the immediate commission of crimes. Our results suggest these
reductions may come at the cost of future crimes.
Clearly further research is required to illuminate these effects more fully. A richer
understanding of the ways inmates respond to both harsher conditions and exposure
to more violent peers would allow prison systems to reduce socially costly recidivism
by redesigning their assignment systems, both between and within prisons. Prison
sentences and conditions could, in principle, be tailored to minimize the social costs of
crime, taking into account both current crime deterrence and future crime recurrence.
With the volume of prisoners that move through the American system showing no
signs of decline, the potential for social gains through such an exercise is considerable.
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Table 1: Security Level and Prison Conditions
Percent of Inmates Security Level
Minimum Low Medium Maximum
Receiving a furlough 14.20% 2.50% 1.60% 0.78%
In cell for > 8 hours per day 49.01 55.21 55.03 58.22
Seriously injured 16.54 19.21 20.45 22.19
Found guilty of prison rule violation for:
Possession of drugs 0.45 2.02 3.59 15.78
Possession of alcohol 0.11 0.47 2.63 9.53
Possession of a weapon 0.00 0.12 0.99 7.66
Assaulting an inmate 1.07 3.32 5.05 9.38
Assaulting a correction officer 0.00 0.36 1.04 5.94
Number of observations 1782 843 2315 640
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Department of Justice (1991).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Security level All Minimum Low >Low
Mean time to rearrest 2.37 2.53∗∗ 2.17 2.16
Percent of inmates who are:
Rearrested within 3 years 46.84 37.83∗∗ 54.55 60.23
High school graduates 55.79 64.64∗∗ 46.06 44.02
Previously convicted 68.74 58.37∗∗ 80.61 82.24
Married as of arrest 38.42 43.54 36.36 29.34
Employed before arrest 53.79 63.69∗∗ 44.85 39.38
White 71.26 76.43∗∗ 67.88 62.93
Male 92.21 86.12∗∗ 100.00 99.61
Number of observations 950 526 165 259
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: ** denotes difference in means between minimum and low security
statistically significant at the 5% level
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Table 3: Comparison of Proportions
Security custody Number of Percent rearrested within
score range obs. One year Two years Three years
5-6 91 19.78 36.26 48.35
7-8 51 33.33 54.90 62.75
Difference 13.55∗ 18.64∗∗ 14.39∗
6 44 22.73 40.91 52.27
7 31 32.26 54.84 61.29
Difference 9.53 13.93 9.02
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; ** denotes significant at 5%
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Table 4: Probit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of rearrest within
Three years Two years One year
Score>6 0.2003 0.2515 0.1826 0.1427
(0.1155) (0.1105) (0.0976) (0.0909)
Score>9 0.1702 0.1627 0.0424 0.0106
(0.1337) (0.1217) (0.0857) (0.0709)
Score>13 0.0365 0.2353 -0.1022 -0.0952
(0.1950) (0.1960) (0.0510) (0.0377)
Security custody 0.1737 0.1784 0.1417 0.0988
score (0.0417) (0.0356) (0.0268) (0.0254)
Score2 -0.03 -0.0331 -0.0304 -0.0234
(0.0129) (0.0107) (0.0080) (0.0074)
Score3 0.0017 0.0019 0.0021 0.0017
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Score4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Demographic NO NO NO YES
controls?
Observations 948 948 948 948
Pseudo-R2 0.1163 0.1224 0.1047 0.1643
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls include age and
dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions, married, white, male, and em-
ployed prior to arrest. Coefficients reflect marginal effects evaluated at the mean.
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Table 5: Two-stage Least Squares Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rearrest occurred within
Three years Two years One year
Security level > minimum 0.3276 0.6317 0.4649 0.4752
(0.2699) (0.2685) (0.2189) (0.2359)
Security custody score 0.1681 0.1172 0.0893 0.0312
(0.0688) (0.0684) (0.0558) (0.0558)
Score2 -0.0466 -0.0300 -0.0206 -0.0045
(0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0239) (0.0237)
Score3 0.0051 0.0022 0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Score4 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Demographic controls? NO NO NO YES
Observations 690 690 690 690
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls include age and
dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions, married, white, male, and em-
ployed prior to arrest. First stage estimates (with standard errors in parentheses) are
as follows:
Pr(low)= 0.0792 + 0.5639 (score>6) + 0.0444 (score)
(0.0189) (0.1160) (0.0506)
+ 0.0129 (score2) - 0.0028 (score3) + 0.0001 (score4)
(0.0230) (0.0034) (0.0002)
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Table 6: Control Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is dummy for:
High school Prior White Employed before
graduate convictions arrest
Score>6 -0.0740 0.1037 -0.0389 -0.1866
(0.1196) (0.1043) (0.1033) (0.1215)
Score>9 -0.1229 -0.1958 -0.0855 -0.2100
(0.1384) (0.2035) (0.1189) (0.1512)
Score>13 0.2454 -0.5038 -0.0404 -0.3230
(0.1508) (0.3187) (0.1746) (0.1799)
Security custody score -0.1161 0.1689 -0.1109 -0.1355
(0.0438) (0.0428) (0.0370) (0.0465)
Score2 0.0127 -0.0368 0.0167 0.0066
(0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0112) (0.0150)
Score3 -0.0004 0.0033 -0.0009 0.0007
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0014)
Score4 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 948 948 948 948
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients reflect marginal effects evalu-
ated at the mean.
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Table 7: Administrative Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of rearrest within
Three years Two years One year
Score>6 -0.0514 -0.1560 -0.0436 -0.0279
(0.2005) (0.1775) (0.1178) (0.1174)
Score>9 0.1103 -0.1046 0.0822 0.0417
(0.3270) (0.2742) (0.2304) (0.2036)
Score>13 0.6434 0.7658 0.6010 0.7279
(0.0461) (0.0460) (0.4668) (0.3578)
Security custody score 0.1786 0.2266 0.0712 0.0458
(0.1282) (0.1312) (0.0760) (0.0747)
Score2 -0.0498 -0.0790 -0.0081 -0.0043
(0.0519) (0.0529) (0.0243) (0.0236)
Score3 0.0070 0.0122 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Score4 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Demographic controls? NO NO NO YES
Observations 211 211 211 211
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls include age and
dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions, married, white, male, and em-
ployed prior to arrest. Coefficients reflect marginal effects evaluated at the mean.
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Figure 1: Inmate Load and Security Designation Form
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4 Appendix: Constructing the Security Custody
Score
Here, we detail the process by which a prisoner is assigned a security custody score by
the bureau of prisons. Upon entry to the federal prison system, an inmate is processed
using an Inmate Load and Security Designation Form (see Figure 1). Seven separate
items are evaluated by a regional designator for each inmate. Each item is governed
by a procedure found in the Bureau of Prisons Security Designation and Custody
Classification Manual (Federabl ureau of Prisons, 1982). Discussing each item in the
order in which it is addressed on the Designation Form:
4.1 Type of Detainer
This category refers to the severity of chargers for which the inmate has not yet been
tried and sentenced. A pending charge under a state statute would fall under this
category, for example. The severity of the worst such charge is ranked from 0 to 7
according to the severity of offense scale (discussed below), and this number become
the inmates type of detainer score, with the exception that 0 now means no pending
charges, and a score of 1 indicates a pending charge with a severity score of either 0
or 1.
4.2 Severity of Current Offense
All offenses are classified according to a Bureau of Prisons Severity of Offense Scale,
which exhaustively partitioned penal code into 5 categories corresponding to point
values of 0-lowest, 1-low/moderate, 3-moderate, 5-high , and 7-greatest. The severity
of current offense score for an inmate is the severity of the most severe documented
behavior associated with the crime for which the individual is currently serving a
period of incarceration. For example, if an individual was involved in an armed
robbery of a bank (which scores a 7), but plead down at trial to simple robbery
(which scores a 5), they would score a 7.
4.3 Expected Length of Incarceration
To determine this value the regional designator first looks up the reference (standard)
sentence length in months for the inmate, based only on the offense for which the
inmate is surving time. These are found in the Expected Length of Incarceration
Scale in the Sentencing Handbook. The minimum of this number and the months to
which the inmate was actually sentenced is compared to a set of cutoffs, with 0-12
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months receiving 0 points, 13-59 receiving 1, 60-83 receiving 3, and 84 or more months
receiving 5 points.
4.4 Type of Prior Commitments
If an inmate has never been incarcerated before he receives a 0. Otherwise, the most
severe offense he has been incarcerated for (as evaluated by the severity of current
offense scale) is used. An inmate receives 1 point if his most serious prior offense is
classified as either low or low-moderate. Any more serious offence conviction leads to
a score of 3.
4.5 History of Escape Attempts
This measure classifies the escape history of the individual. The history includes a
individual’s entire background of escapes or attempts to escape from confinement,
excluding the current offense. This includes documented flight to escape prosecution,
and if multiple escape attempts were made the most severe is used. The severity of
the escape attempt is classified as either minor or serious. A minor attempt must
have been from an open institution (work camp, work release, furlough, flight to avoid
prosecution) and must not have involved a threat of violence. All other attempts are
considered serious. As the security designation form details, this severity and the
time elapsed since the attempt, combine to form this score component.
4.6 History of Violence
This classifies the violent acts history of the individual. This history comprises a
individual’s entire background of violent acts, excluding their current offense. Vio-
lent acts enter the history even if noted by a prison discipline committee but never
prosecuted. If an inmate has multiple such acts, the most severe is used. The severity
of each act is classified as either minor or serious. A minor act is a simple assault,
fight, or domestic squabble. Aggravated assault or worse, arson, or any act involv-
ing a weapon, or explosives is considered serious. As the security designation form
details, this severity and the time elapsed since the act combine to form this score
component.
4.7 Pre-Commitment Status
An inmate scores 0 if prior to incarceration he was not out on his own recognizance
and/or did not voluntarily surrender. He scores -3 if he was released on his own
recognizance during his trial without posting bail to ensure appearance, but was
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incarcerated post-trial. An inmate scores -6 if he meets the previous criteria and
surrendered voluntarily to confinement, i.e. was not escorted by a law official to the
place of his confinement.
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Appendix Table 1: Score and Security Level
Score Assigned Number Percent of inmates in security level:
level of obs. Minimum Low Low/Med Medium
0 1 411 78.35 6.33 2.43 4.87
1 46 63.04 17.39 6.52 8.70
2 45 77.78 17.78 0.00 4.44
3 56 64.29 25.00 1.79 5.36
4 79 58.23 21.52 10.13 5.06
5 47 57.45 27.66 0.00 10.64
6 44 47.73 36.36 6.82 4.55
7 2 32 3.13 56.25 25.00 9.38
8 20 10.00 65.00 25.00 0.00
9 33 9.09 63.64 18.18 6.06
10 3 26 3.85 26.92 53.85 15.38
11 17 11.76 5.88 70.59 5.88
12 31 3.23 3.23 61.29 29.03
13 11 0.00 18.18 18.18 54.55
14 4 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 70.00
15 10 0.00 0.00 10.00 80.00
16 8 0.00 0.00 12.50 62.50
17 7 0.00 0.00 14.29 42.86
18 9 0.00 0.00 22.22 44.44
19 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
20 2 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
21 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
22 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
TOTAL 950 55.37 17.37 10.21 10.21
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Appendix Table 2a: Computing the Security Custody Score
Inmate characteristic Score Range
From To
Type of detainer 0 (None) 7 (Greatest)
(severity of outstanding charges)
Severity of current offense 0 (Lowest) 7 (Greatest)
Expected length of incarceration 0 (0-12 Months) 5 (84+ Months)
Type of prior commitments 0 (None) 3 (Serious)
History of escapes or attempts 0 (None) 7 (Recent Escape)
History of violence 0 (None) 7 (Recent Serious)
Precommitment status -6 (Voluntary Surrender) 0 (None)
(bail, bond, etc. set in trial)
TOTAL 0 36
Appendix Table 2b: Determining the Appropriate Security Level
Score Range Assigned Security Description Example
Level
0-6 1 Minimum Danbury Camp
7-9 2 Low La Tuna
10-13 3 Low/Medium Otisville
14-22 4 Medium Petersburg
23-29 5 High Leavenworth
30-36 6 High Marion
Source: Federal Bureau of Prisons (1985).
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